The Brain as a Hierarchical Organization by Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo
The Brain as a Hierarchical Organization
by Isabelle Brocas and Juan D. Carrillo ∗
Abstract
Based on recent neuroscience evidence, we model the brain as a dual-system organiza-
tion subject to three conﬂicts: asymmetric information, temporal horizon and incentive
salience. Under the ﬁrst and second conﬂicts, we show that the uninformed system
imposes a positive link between consumption and labor at every period. Furthermore,
decreasing impatience endogenously emerges as a consequence of these two conﬂicts. Un-
der the ﬁrst and third conﬂicts, it becomes optimal to set a consumption cap. Finally,
we discuss the behavioral implications of these rules for choice bracketing and expense
tracking, and for consumption over the life-cycle. (JEL D82, D87).
“The heart has its reasons which reason knows nothing of”
(Blaise Pascal (1670), Les Pens´ ees)
Economics has experienced an inﬂow of fresh ideas following an addition of elements
from psychology into economic models. A recent literature incorporates intrapersonal
tensions into these models. The present paper provides a step in this direction. Our
basic premise is the existence of three types of brain based conﬂicts. First, a conﬂict
between the information available in diﬀerent areas of the brain, which we refer to as an
“asymmetric information conﬂict.” Second, a conﬂict between the importance attached
to temporally close versus temporally distant events, which we refer to as a “temporal
horizon conﬂict.” And third, a conﬂict between the relative weight in utility attached to
tempting versus non-tempting goods, which we refer to as an “incentive salience conﬂict.”
Starting from these three assumptions about the architecture of the brain, we construct an
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1orthodox multi-period, multi-action model. The model is solved with tools adapted from
mechanism design and is used to provide foundations for discounting and an explanation
for several behavioral anomalies.
Asymmetric information and temporal conﬂicts is the focus of section 2. We consider
an individual who undertakes two activities during several periods, one pleasant (con-
sumption) and one unpleasant (labor). Activities are linked through an intertemporal
budget constraint. To model the temporal and informational conﬂicts, we divide the indi-
vidual into an impulsive/myopic system (the agent, he) and a cognitive/forward-looking
system (the principal, she). We then assume that the marginal value of consumption
varies from period to period and is only known by the agent. Despite the fact that
the cognitive system has control over the impulsive system, she cannot impose her ﬁrst-
best choices due to the informational conﬂict. Instead, she proposes a menu of pairs
where the levels of both activities are positively linked within each period, allowing the
agent to signal which of these pairs he prefers. Thus, we show that a self-disciplining
intrapersonal rule of behavior of the form “work more today if you want to consume
more today” emerges endogenously (Propositions 1 and 2). The consumption pattern
exhibits properties that are consistent with modern behavioral theories of choice over
time: decreasing impatience and diﬀerent degrees of impatience for diﬀerent categories of
activities (Proposition 3). Thus, discounting is derived from the primitives of our model
(informational asymmetry) rather than assumed as an intrinsic feature of preferences.
The behavioral implications of the model are discussed in section 3. First, our theory
rationalizes narrow choice bracketing, a practice based on local rather than global opti-
mization that standard models have problems explaining (Daniel Read, George Loewen-
stein and Matthew Rabin 1999). Indeed, by separating consumption into arbitrarily
deﬁned categories and imposing a negative relationship between expenditures on each of
them, the principal can achieve ﬁnancial discipline. Second, our psychological personal
rule can help understand some empirical ﬁndings diﬃcult to reconcile with the theory of
intertemporal consumption (Hersh Shefrin and Richard Thaler 1988). In particular, our
rule predicts that consumption tracks earned income, simply because self-discipline can
be more easily implemented in periods with better access to labor. The rule also predicts
an imperfect substitutability between mandatory and discretionary savings.
In section 4, we abstract from the temporal dimension and focus on the informational
and incentive conﬂicts. In this case, the individual must allocate resources between a
tempting good and a non-tempting good. The relative desirability of the tempting good
2is only known to the agent. We formalize the concept of ‘incentive salience’ by assuming
that the agent has a biased motivation compared to the fundamental preferences of
the principal. Namely, the agent is willing to engage in excessive consumption of the
tempting good. When the degree of the conﬂict increases with the desirability of the
tempting good, it is optimal for the principal to impose a consumption cap. That is,
she sets a non-intrusive rule of the form “do what you want as long as you don’t abuse.”
When the degree of conﬂict decreases in the desirability of the tempting good, it may
become optimal to waste resources as a commitment device against incurring excesses
(Propositions 4 and 5).
The main justiﬁcations for our informational, temporal and incentive conﬂicts in the
brain come from neuroscientiﬁc research. Section 1 reviews this evidence.1 The existing
literature in psychology and, to a lesser extent, economics has also addressed these issues.
The remainder of this section summarizes some ﬁndings.
Although controversial in economics, informational conﬂicts within the individual are
widely accepted in other disciplines. Some inﬂuential theories in social psychology rely
on this assumption. Cognitive dissonance (Leon Festinger 1957) is based on the idea that
an individual can simultaneously hold two contradictory beliefs. When this happens, the
person acts upon one of them to reduce the discomfort created by such inconsistency.
According to the theory of self-deception (Ruben Gur and Harold Sackeim 1979), one of
these contradictory beliefs may not be subject to awareness, and this unawareness will be
motivated. Self-perception theory (Daryl Bem 1967) makes a stronger statement: indi-
viduals do not have the capability to observe directly their own attitudes and therefore,
they need to infer them from their emotions and other internal states. In other words, the
individual is like an outside observer who relies on external cues to learn his inner states.
As for economics, Ronit Bodner and Prelec (2003) is the only existing formal study of
asymmetric information within the individual. The authors focus on self-signaling, or
how the gut who possesses some information that cannot be introspected by the mind
uses actions to signal preferences to himself. A diﬀerent but related idea can be found in
the literature on the construction of preferences. Recent experimental evidence suggests
that preferences for ordinary products are unknown and malleable, even after sampling
(Dan Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec 2003, 2006). Several theories have been proposed
to understand how preferences are constructed over time, through experience, and with
1For summaries of how neuroscience can help economics, see Colin Camerer, Loewenstein and Drazen
Prelec (2004, 2005).
3the help of memory processes (Sarah Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic (2006, part V)). Under
this interpretation, our model argues that, in the process of constructing preferences, the
impulsive part of the individual should not be repressed. Instead, it should be permitted
to make (optimally designed) constrained choices that facilitate the revelation of current
preferences while reducing their possible negative eﬀects on future preferences.
Temporal conﬂicts have also been stressed in psychology (see e.g. George Ainslie
1992). They are somewhat more accepted in economics than informational conﬂicts,
either under hyperbolic discounting (Robert Strotz (1956), David Laibson (1997) and
others) or under some other formulation of the self-control problem (Bernard Caillaud,
Daniel Cohen and Bruno Jullien (1999), Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2001) and
others).2 A strand of this literature has studied the eﬀects of imperfect self-knowledge
on decision-making.3 In these studies, the temporal and informational conﬂicts occur
between periods. Instead, we stress the existence of these conﬂicts within each period.
Hence, the view of the brain as a multi-system organization. In this respect, our paper is
closer to Thaler and Shefrin (1981) and Shefrin and Thaler (1988), to our knowledge the
ﬁrst studies which divided the individual into two entities, one myopic and one forward-
looking. These articles explain the beneﬁts of commitment devices such as mandatory
pension plans and lump-sum bonuses in promoting savings. They have been extended
and further developed by Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (2006) and Loewenstein
and Edward O’Donoghue (2005). The ﬁrst paper argues that the split-self approach can
explain dynamic preference reversals and the paradox of risk-aversion in the large and
in the small. The second shows that this framework sets a parsimonious benchmark to
study the optimal decision to exert willpower. None of these papers, however, consider
asymmetric information or incentive salience, two key driving forces of our analysis.
Finally, the biasing role of aﬀect on cognition has received a growing interest across
disciplines. It has been argued that the aﬀective system helps (Antonio Damasio, 1994),
constrains (Jon Elster, 2004) or prevents (Roy Baumeister, 2003) the cognitive system
from making optimal choices. Loewenstein (1996) argues that emotions and drives cause
individuals to behave contrary to their long-term interest. This dichotomy between im-
2See Caillaud and Jullien (2000) for a review of diﬀerent ways to model time-inconsistent preferences,
Andrew Caplin and John Leahy (2001) for the time-inconsistency eﬀect generated by anticipatory feelings
and Roland B´ enabou and Marek Pycia (2002) for a planner-doer reinterpretation of the self control
problem.
3See e.g. Carrillo and Thomas Mariotti (2000), Brocas and Carrillo (2004), B´ enabou and Jean Tirole
(2004), Marco Bataglini, B´ enabou and Tirole (2005) and Manuel Amador, Ivan Werning and George-
Marios Angeletos (2006).
4pulsive and reﬂective behavior has also been the object of neuroeconomic research. Jess
Benhabib and Alberto Bisin (2005) study the consumption choice of an individual who
can invoke either a costless automatic process which is susceptible to temptation or a
costly control process which is immune to temptation. B. Douglas Bernheim and Anto-
nio Rangel (2004) analyze addiction under the assumption that the individual operates
in either a ‘cold mode’ where he selects his preferred alternative or a ‘hot mode’ where
choices may be suboptimal given preferences. Note that, in these dual-system models,
information is complete. Impulsive choices are automatic responses to shocks or cues.
By contrast, in our model, the agent optimizes according to a well-deﬁned goal, only his
motivation is biased. Because of his superior information, the agent may end up aﬀecting
choices. In that respect, our static model with incentive salience and two activities is for-
mally closer to the model by Amador, Werning and Angeletos (2006), where the conﬂict
is based on hyperbolic discounting and the two activities are consumption at diﬀerent
dates. Under some conditions, we replicate the main conclusion of that paper, namely
the second-best optimality of a consumption cap.
1 Conﬂicts in the brain: some evidence from neuro-
science
Brain modularity is a well-accepted neurobiological fact.4 There is also ample evidence
that brain systems are often in competition and conﬂict.5 As discussed above, the basic
premises of our analysis are the existence of informational, temporal and incentive con-
ﬂicts in the brain. We proceed with a brief review of the evidence in neuroscience that
supports each of these conﬂicts as well as the connections among them.
1. Asymmetric Information. Although not heavily emphasized in the neuroeconomics
literature, asymmetric information is, for purely anatomical and evolutionary reasons,
arguably the least controversial of the conﬂicts proposed here. Neural connectivity is a
strongly limited resource that evolution spends sparingly. As a result, most brain areas
are unidirectionally connected to others. These restrictions physiologically constrain the
4By contrast, it has been demonstrated by anatomists and neuroscientists that, contrary to the
popular view based on theories developed in the 1940s and 1950s, reason and emotion do not pertain to
two distinct brain systems (see Joseph LeDoux (1996, ch.4) for a non-technical historical perspective).
5See for example the reviews by Russell Poldrack and Paul Rodriguez (2004) on competition be-
tween memory systems and Earl Miller and Jonathan Cohen (2001) on competition between information
processing systems.
5ﬂow of information. Neuroscientiﬁc research provides many examples of informational
asymmetries using brain imaging techniques (PET scan and fMRI). Studies have shown
activation of the ventral striatum, right striatum and amygdala in response to novelty,
implicit learning and fear, in each case without conscious awareness of subjects (see
Gregory Berns, Jonathan Cohen and Mark Mintum (1997), Scott Rauch et al. (1997)
and Paul Whalen et al. (1998), respectively). Research on individuals with brain lesions
reveals similar dissociations. Despite their having an intact declarative memory, patients
with damage in the neostriatum and the amygdala exhibit, respectively, an impaired
ability for gradual learning and an impaired capacity to acquire conditioned responses to
emotional stimuli (Barbara Knowlton, Jennifer Mangels and Larry Squire (1996), Antoine
Bechara et al. (1995)).
2. Temporal horizon. The evidence of a time-evaluation conﬂict is more indirect, and
yet more popular in neuroeconomics. On the far-sighted end, Damasio (1994) demon-
strates that damage in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex impairs the ability of patients
to engage in long term planning. This severe myopia is conﬁrmed by Bechara et al. (1999)
using a gambling task experiment. On the short-sighted end, LeDoux (1996) shows that
the amygdala plays a crucial role in the expression of impulsive, emotional behavior.
Bechara et al. (1999) conclude that patients with lesions in the amygdala have an im-
paired capacity to evaluate immediate gratiﬁcations. Taking both pieces of evidence to-
gether, Bechara (2005) constructs a neural theory of willpower. The author distinguishes
between an impulsive system (mainly, ventral striatum and amygdala) which processes
information about immediate rewards and a reﬂective system (mainly, ventromedial and
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate) which processes information about
future rewards. These two broadly deﬁned sets of brain structures roughly correspond to
our agent and principal (see Bechara (2005, Fig.1)). Samuel McClure et al. (2004) take
the analysis one step further. Based on their fMRI experiments, they argue that the in-
teraction between short-sighted and far-sighted systems provides neuroscientiﬁc support
for hyperbolic discounting. This view has been recently challenged by Paul Glimcher,
Joseph Kable and Kenway Louie (2007).
3. Incentive salience. The importance of impulses and urges in the behavior of
emotional an addicted subjects has long been recognized but rarely modelled in eco-
nomics (Carrillo 2005). The innovative work in neuroscience by Terry Robinson and
Kent Berridge (2003) and Berridge (2003) shows that one system mediates the feeling of
pleasure and pain (the “liking” system) and a diﬀerent system mediates the motivation or
6incentive to seek pleasure and avoid pain (the “wanting” system). Using pharmacological
manipulations, the authors demonstrate that intervention in the mesolimbic dopamine
system (MDS) can enhance the willingness of rats to work for food without aﬀecting
the beneﬁt of eating it. In a related experiment, subliminal stimuli can alter manifested
choices of consumers (wanting decision) without aﬀecting the expected pleasure derived
from the commodities (liking outcome). Although, their work is particularly relevant for
addiction (see Robinson and Berridge (2003) and the related economic model proposed
by Bernheim and Rangel (2004)), this incentive salience mechanism also applies to other
impulse-driven choices (Berridge, 2003). The authors acknowledge that wanting and lik-
ing interact through an intricate web of brain circuits. They also emphasize the role
of the nucleus accumbens and the amygdala in the mediation of wanting, and the role
of the prefrontal cortex in overriding MDS-generated impulses (Berridge and Robinson
(2003, Fig.2)). Furthermore, it is suggested that motivational salience can be manifested
without conscious awareness.
The combination of evidence about asymmetric information, temporal horizon and
incentive salience provides interesting insights. First, the evaluation of alternatives with
immediate eﬀects originates in the areas of the brain that we have labelled as impulsive
and short-sighted (ventral striatum and amygdala among others). Second, planning, me-
diation, anticipation of future events, and other high level cognitive functions are located
in the areas of the brain that we have labelled as reﬂective and far-sighted (prefrontal
cortex and anterior cingulate among others). Third, the reﬂective system exerts regula-
tory control on the impulsive system. At the same time, the impulsive system manages to
inﬂuence the choices of the reﬂective system (Miller and Cohen (2001), Bechara (2005)).
It should be acknowledged that this review constitutes only a fraction of the current
neuroscientiﬁc research on the subject. Furthermore, some of these theories have raised
serious controversies, which are not discussed here for space considerations. Nonethe-
less, we argue that taken together they provide support for a brain architecture based
on a partly uniformed, forward-looking principal and a better informed, short-sighted,
motivationally biased agent.
A last clariﬁcation is in order. On the one hand, we advocate a literal interpretation of
our dual-system model: the brain is, and therefore should be modelled as, a multi-system
structure. On the other hand, the revelation games, incentive contracts and optimization
processes are based on the usual ‘as if’ economic approach. Despite the abstract ﬂavor of
the optimal mechanisms, there is a natural way to implement them, which is discussed
7in section 2.5.
2 Temporal and informational conﬂicts in the brain
2.1 The general setting
We consider an individual who lives a ﬁnite number of periods t ∈ {1,2,...,T}. At
each period t, the individual undertakes two actions, xt ∈ Xt and yt ∈ Yt. Each action
can be pleasant (purchase of commodities, enrollment in leisure activities) or unpleasant
(dieting, working). The instantaneous utility of the individual is:
Ut(xt,yt;θt)
where θt ∈ Θt is a parameter that captures the relative (positive or negative) appeal of
the diﬀerent actions.
Our ﬁrst brain conﬂict, namely the diﬀerences in time-horizon, is modelled in the
tradition of Thaler and Shefrin (1981). First, there is one entity, the principal (she)
who is cognitive and forward-looking. Second, at each date t there is another entity,
agent-t (he) who is impulsive and myopic. Agent-t maximizes his instantaneous utility
Ut(xt,yt;θt) without any concern for the past or the future. The principal maximizes
the sum of utilities of agents in the remaining periods. This temporal conﬂict of the
self has been suggested in several disciplines. Thaler and Shefrin (1981) provide a ﬁrst
formalization in economics under a “Planner and Doer” label. Bechara (2005) refers
to the “Reﬂective and Impulsive” systems in his neurocognitive theory of willpower.
In this paper, we adopt a more neutral “Principal and Agent” terminology borrowed
from contract theory. Formally, St, the intertemporal utility of the principal from the





There are two reasons why we do not impose any exogenous time-preference rate from the
principal’s viewpoint. First, it sharpens the contrast between principal and agent. Second
and most importantly, the choice resulting from the conﬂicts between brain systems may
exhibit a time-preference. Our assumption allows us to identify it as the consequence
of such conﬂicts without any exogenous interference (see section 2.4). In what follows,
we assume that the principal controls at no cost the actions taken at date t. She may,
however, choose to keep an information channel open and be receptive to the signals sent
8by agent-t.6 This formalization captures two basic premises of the relationship between
impulse and cognition: the reﬂective system is ultimately responsible for choices, but the
impulsive system can aﬀect these choices (Bechara, 2005). A more detailed discussion
about implementation is provided in section 2.5.
Our second brain conﬂict, the restriction in the ﬂow of information, is modelled
in the tradition of the contract theory literature. We assume that, even though the
principal can impose her preferred actions (xt,yt) at each date t, only agent-t knows
θt, their relative desirability. Such an assumption captures the physiological restrictions
brain systems encounter when trying to access information, or the limited conscious
awareness of motivations discussed before. This asymmetry of information is problematic
for the principal since her optimal decision depends on the parameter θt. It is worth
emphasizing that our principal and agent are not two localized brain areas. Instead, each
system is composed of several brain structures, which play a more or less important role
depending on the application. What is key for our analysis is that there are temporal
and informational conﬂicts between these two sets of structures, and that there are no
conﬂicts, information asymmetries, or aggregation problems within each system.













The function B(·) can have diﬀerent interpretations. It may represent a budget con-
straint; there is an initial endowment and expenditures in the diﬀerent goods deplete
the budget. Alternatively, if one activity requires income and the other generates it, the
constraint may reﬂect an intertemporal budget balance that must be satisﬁed between
the two. More generally, the function may capture the existence of positive or negative
internalities, where current actions aﬀect the utility of future actions (e.g., a meal high
in cholesterol and a cigarette provide immediate pleasure but decrease future health,
whereas an hour spent at the gym requires eﬀort but improves health).
6For the purpose of our model, it can also be assumed that agent-t is in charge of decisions and the
principal can costlessly restrict the set of alternatives at his disposal. This is the approach followed for
example by Thaler and Shefrin (1981) and Fudenberg and Levine (2006). It is important to note that
this alternative formulation where reward circuits are assumed to have control over actions has a weaker
neurobiological foundation.
92.2 Consumption and labor under full information
For expositional considerations, the rest of the section focuses on a particular application.
Later, we discuss how to modify the analysis in order to capture other situations. At each
date t, the individual chooses the amount of pleasant consumption ct ∈ Ct = [0,+∞)
and unpleasant labor nt ∈ Nt = [0, ¯ n]. The instantaneous utility is:
Ut(ct,nt;θt) = θt u(ct) − nt
where u0 > 0 and u00 < 0, and θt is the willingness to consume at date t, henceforth
referred to as valuation or type. For each unit of labor, the individual obtains one unit
of income that can be consumed in any period. Assume a perfect capital market where
the individual can save and borrow at the exogenous interest rate r. The intertemporal









This formalization diﬀers from the standard life-cycle model with only one decision (con-
sumption) and an exogenous income stream: here, future consumption can be increased
by increasing savings (i.e., reducing current consumption) but also by increasing current
or future labor. In other words, there is scope for rules that compensate pleasant with
unpleasant activities in a given period.
As a benchmark, consider a two-period horizon with full information. Given that
the principal can impose her desired levels of consumption and labor at each period, the




θ1 u(c1) − n1 + θ2 u(c2) − n2
s.t. ct(θt) > 0, nt(θt) ∈ [0, ¯ n] ∀t, θt (Ft)
c1(θ1)(1 + r) + c2(θ2) 6 n1(θ1)(1 + r) + n2(θ2) (BB)
where (Ft) is the feasibility constraint for ct and nt and (BB) is the intertemporal budget
constraint. Our ﬁrst result characterizes the solution when ¯ n is such that the optimal
second-period labor is interior (the proof is trivial and omitted).7
7Suﬃcient conditions are ¯ n <
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The analysis can easily be extended to other corner solutions where, for example, no
1 < ¯ n and no
2 = 0.
10Lemma 1 (Full information) The optimal consumption and labor pairs (co
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Since there is a positive net return on savings, it is optimal for the principal to require
the highest amount of labor in the ﬁrst period. Second-period labor is then adjusted to
meet the intertemporal constraint. Consumption at date t is proportional to agent-t’s
valuation. Also, for the same valuation, consumption is higher in period 2 than in period
1 because of the positive return on savings (i.e., c2(θ) > c1(θ) for all θ). As r → 0,
the allocation of labor between periods becomes irrelevant and inter-period diﬀerences
in consumption are solely determined by diﬀerences in valuation. Given that ﬁrst-period
labor is maximal and second-period labor is adjusted to meet the intertemporal budget
constraint, consumption levels depend only on valuations. That is, there is no intra-
period link between consumption and labor. This result depends on the quasi-linear
utility formulation. We adopt this functional form precisely because having no exogenous
ties between the variables within each period constitutes an interesting benchmark for
comparison.
2.3 Imperfect knowledge of valuation
Suppose now that the principal does not know the true valuation. We assume that valu-
ations are independently drawn from the same continuous distribution over the support
Θt = Θ = [θ,θ] for all t with 0 < θ < θ, a strictly positive density f(·), and a cumulative
distribution function F(·) that satisﬁes the standard monotone hazard rate conditions:
(F(θ)/f(θ))
0 > 0 and ((1 − F(θ))/f(θ))
0 < 0. Agent-t learns his current willingness to
consume θt at the beginning of the period. The principal only knows the distribution
from which θt is drawn.
Asymmetric information in the brain generates endogenous constraints on optimal
choices. We wish to underscore the methodological importance of this contribution.
As reviewed earlier, there exists a literature where the individual is split into entities
that play an intra-period game. However, the starting point of these studies is the
existence of an exogenous cost (cost of self-control, cost of exerting willpower, cost of
11attention, cost of hot choices) that inevitably leads to trade-oﬀs (fewer resources but
better allocation, costly thinking but optimal decision-making, higher current utility but
increased likelihood of a future hot mode). The speciﬁc way of modelling these costs
crucially aﬀects which behaviors can and cannot be rationalized. Unfortunately, given
the current knowledge in neuroscience, it is diﬃcult to pinpoint the right assumptions
for these functions. We propose a diﬀerent, more agnostic methodology. Rather than
a cost, our argument rests on asymmetric information, a constraint on decision-making.
The principal can then freely design any mechanism she wants in order to promote her
favorite actions. This approach, borrowed from the mechanism design literature, is based
on more primitive assumptions (conﬂicts between brain systems) and does not presuppose
a speciﬁc tradeoﬀ.
With this in mind, we oﬀer a second benchmark for comparison. This benchmark
consists of the optimal choices when the principal cannot (or chooses not to) elicit in-
formation from the agents. In this case, she precommits to the actions that provide the








θ1 u(c1) − n1 + θ2 u(c2) − n2
i
dF(θ1)dF(θ2)
s.t. ct > 0, nt ∈ [0, ¯ n] ∀t
c1(1 + r) + c2 6 n1(1 + r) + n2
Assuming that ¯ n is such that the optimal second-period labor is interior, the solution is
as follows (the proof is again trivial and omitted).
Lemma 2 (Asymmetry with no communication) The optimal consumption and
labor pairs (ct,nt) selected by the principal at date t under asymmetric information and
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The principal cannot set a consumption level that varies with the valuation, and
thus ends up choosing an average amount of consumption. Naturally, this is above
optimal in low valuation days and below optimal in high valuations days. The individual,
nonetheless, works the maximum amount in period 1.
12The principal can improve on that solution by deciding to elicit information from
the agent. By the very nature of the problem, the principal deals with agent-1 and
agent-2 sequentially, so the game is solved by backward induction. At date 2, there is no
conﬂict of preferences between the principal and agent-2 (S2 ≡ U2). Hence, the choice
set of agent-2 does not need to be constrained. Equivalently, agent-2 does not have any
incentive to send signals that could mislead the principal about his current valuation.
Assuming that agent-1 has consumed and worked (c1,n1) and that the weak inequality
(BB) has to be satisﬁed, the levels of consumption and labor in date 2 are identical to
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At date 1, rather than full freedom or full control, the principal relies on an incentive
mechanism. More precisely, the principal restricts the choice set of agent-1 to a menu of
pairs {(c1(θ1),n1(θ1))}. Agent-1 can choose any of these pairs or send signals informing
the principal which pair he prefers. Applying the revelation principle, this direct mecha-
















s.t. θ1 u(c1(θ1)) − n1(θ1) > θ1 u(c1(˜ θ1)) − n1(˜ θ1) ∀ θ1, ˜ θ1 (IC)
c1(θ1) > 0, n1(θ1) ∈ [0, ¯ n] (F)
In P∗, the principal maximizes expected welfare under the feasibility constraint (F),
as in program Poo. The solution must also satisfy an incentive compatibility constraint
(IC).8 This latter constraint ensures that agent-1 weakly prefers the pair (c1(θ1),n1(θ1))
rather than any other pair (c1(˜ θ1),n1(˜ θ1)) with ˜ θ1 6= θ1 when his valuation is θ1. Note that
the constraint (BB) is binding and embedded in the second period choices (c∗
2(θ2),n∗
2(θ2)).
The solution to P∗ characterizes the second-best levels of consumption and labor at date
1 from the principal’s viewpoint given the information asymmetry.
Proposition 1 (Asymmetric information with temporal conﬂict) There exists
a cutoﬀ θ∗
1 (< θ) such that the principal restricts the choice set of agent-1 to a menu
8Contrary to standard contract theory problems, this program has no participation constraint. Note,
however, that the bounds c1 > 0 and n1 6 ¯ n play a related role in ensuring a minimum utility to the
































If θ1 ∈ [θ,θ∗
1], agent-1 selects the pair (c∗
1(θ1),n∗
1(θ1)). If θ1 ∈ (θ∗
1,θ], agent-1 selects the
same pair (c∗
1(θ∗
1), ¯ n) as an agent-1 with valuation θ∗
1. The principal allows agent-2 any
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2(θ2)
Proposition 1 shows that neither full delegation nor full control is optimal. For in-
stance, the principal would like agent-1 to consume co
1(θ1) and work ¯ n (see Lemma 1)
but she cannot tell what the agent’s true valuation is. Suppose the principal oﬀers the
menu determined in Lemma 1. Because the objective of agent-1 with valuation θ1 is
U1 rather than S1, he will pretend to be a type-θ and consume co
1(θ). In other words,
this menu is not incentive compatible. Another option for the principal could be to
delegate the choices to agent-1 and let him design his preferred consumption and labor
pair. Doing so, however, would be very costly. Since the myopic and selﬁsh agent-1
does not internalize the eﬀect of his choices on agent-2, he would maximize consumption
and minimize labor. A third possibility would be to ignore agent-1’s information and
select the levels of consumption and labor that maximize expected welfare (see Lemma
2). Although an improvement, this would still result in severe ineﬃciencies. Overall, the
best way for the principal to avoid overconsumption is to propose the following rule to
agent-1: “Reveal your consumption needs. The higher your reported needs, the higher
the consumption you will be allocated but also the higher the amount of work you will
provide in exchange.” Demanding more work in exchange of more consumption counters
agent-1’s lack of concern for the future and, at the same time, allows consumption to
vary with valuation.
Notice that diﬀerent valuations do not always translate into diﬀerent choices, that
is, the solution exhibits some pooling. This is the case because agent-1 cannot secure a
minimum utility level (see footnote 8). The principal could sort out agent-1’s type for
9See the appendix for the formal determination of the cutoﬀ θ∗
1.
14all θ1. However, since labor is bounded above by ¯ n, this would require too little work for
low valuations and too much consumption for high valuations. She prefers to attenuate
these two ineﬃciencies by granting the same consumption and requiring maximum labor
for all valuations above a certain cutoﬀ θ∗
1.
It is important to realize that the positive relation between the intertemporal levels
of consumption and labor (work more in your lifetime if you want to consume more
in your lifetime) is not a result but, instead, a consequence of (BB). By contrast, the
self-disciplining rule of working more today to consume more today is a result of the
asymmetric information model. It is neither ﬁrst-best nor an ad-hoc restriction. It does
not arise when the principal knows the valuations (Lemma 1) or when she disregards
the information possessed by agents (Lemma 2). Instead, it emerges as the self-imposed,
second-best rule designed by the cognitive system to counter the tendency of the impulsive
system to indulge in current satisfaction. Hence, the model provides foundations for
behaviors such as: “I will go to this dinner party only if I ﬁrst exercise for an hour” or
“I will eat a slice of this apple pie, but then forego sugar in my coﬀee.”
2.4 The endogenous determination of time preference
In this section, we consider a ﬁnite horizon T (> 2). The choices under full information
are not qualitatively aﬀected. If ¯ n is suﬃciently large, the consumption granted to agent-







Labor is maximized in the ﬁrst τ periods (with τ ∈ {1,...,T −1} depending on the value
of ¯ n). It is adjusted in period τ + 1 to meet the budget constraint, and there is no labor














Under asymmetric information, the principal does not need to worry about dynamic
contracting problems when dealing with each agent, since these have no concern for the
future. Also, if types are independently distributed, the valuation revealed by agent-
t does not help her improve the contract with agent-t + 1. Thus, the same principles
that apply to the two-period case extend to T periods. Assuming that ¯ n is such that
15the principal can induce sorting in every period (formally, n∗
s(θ) > 0 for all s), we can
determine the levels of consumption and labor at each date.
Proposition 2 (Extended horizon) At each date s ∈ {1,...,T − 1}, there exists
a cutoﬀ θ∗
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s(θs)) if θs ∈ [θ,θ∗
s] and (c∗
s(θ∗
s), ¯ n) if θs ∈ (θ∗
s,θ]. Agent-T is
only required to satisfy (BB).
The intraperiod link between consumption and labor is preserved. However, the
temporal horizon inﬂuences both the levels and the relationship between consumption
and labor at each period. This is somewhat expected: even under full information,
the number of remaining periods aﬀects the opportunity cost of current consumption
and the value of current labor. The novelty is that the amount of extra consumption
that the principal needs to grant due to her lack of knowledge of the agent’s desires
(the informational rents) is also aﬀected by the horizon. Since labor is directly tied to
consumption, the amount of extra work also depends on T.
This multi-system approach to intertemporal decision-making allows us to examine a
more fundamental question: the origin of discounting. In the traditional literature, the
role of discounting is to reﬂect an observed tendency of individuals to prefer the present.
The standard model in the absence of discounting is formally equivalent to our model
in the case of full information. Therefore, the choice of a patient individual is given by
the equation that describes ﬁrst-best consumption in our model. We can immediately
see that, for a given valuation θ, consumption increases over time: co
s+1(θ) > co
s(θ). This
occurs because the positive interest rate on savings implies a larger opportunity cost
of consumption in early periods than in later periods. Since, in practice, we typically
observe a preference for the present, it has been necessary to introduce a utility formu-
lation capable of predicting decreasing consumption. The discounted utility formulation,
10See the appendix for the formal determination of the cutoﬀ θ∗
s.
16introduced by Paul Samuelson (1937) and axiomatized by Tjalling Koopmans (1960),
postulates an exogenous rate of impatience and achieves that goal.
The most basic formulation of the discounted utility model assumes, among other
things, that discount rates are stationary, intertemporally independent, and constant
across activities. Thus, its simplicity and mathematical elegance comes at the expense of
realism, as demonstrated in numerous empirical and experimental studies (Shane Freder-
ick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2002). Using insights from psychology, the behavioral
economics literature proposes some variations of the model that describe more accu-
rately the dynamic choices of individuals. A prominent example is hyperbolic discount-
ing (Strotz 1956). The main problem is that, whichever variation we adopt, it is always
based on some exogenous formulation of time-preferences.
Our model proposes to take one step back. In what follows, we derive the dynamic
properties of the consumption path based exclusively on strategic interactions between
brain systems –uninformed utilitarian principal versus informed myopic agents– and show
that the equilibrium behavior is consistent with observed choices. Thus, our approach al-
lows us to identify the endogenous mechanisms that lead to observed impatience, without
relying on any exogenous time-preference parameter.
In order to elicit valuations, the principal has to grant extra consumption. Therefore,
the same positive interest rate that makes early consumption to have a higher opportunity
cost also implies that early labor is more valuable. This means that, for each unit of labor,
the principal is willing to grant more consumption in early periods than in late periods




s+1(θ). In turn, it implies
that, other things being equal, consumption decreases over time: c∗
s(θ) > c∗
s+1(θ). In
other words, for any positive interest rate the informational conﬂict results in a positive
rate of time-preference. Discounting here is derived from the conﬂicts between brain
systems rather than assumed as an intrinsic feature of preferences.
This conclusion can be further developed. Consider an individual with no brain
conﬂict. Assume that period t (> 2) is, from the perspective of period 1, discounted at
an exogenous rate δ(t − 1) which, for simplicity, is assumed to satisfy time separability
(exponential discounting corresponds to δ(t−1) = δt−1). In the absence of commitment
to future actions, a simple extension of the ﬁrst-best consumption level co
s(θ) implies that









17By equating this consumption to the consumption of an asymmetrically informed princi-
pal who puts equal weight on all periods (as described in Proposition 2), we can identify a
preference for the present, or degree of impatience, that depends on the intrapersonal in-
formation asymmetry. The formulation together with its main properties are summarized
in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 (Endogenous time preference) Under asymmetric information and













Some properties of this function are:
(i) Positive time preference rate: δ(t + 1) < δ(t) (< 1) for all t.
(ii) Decreasing impatience: δ(t)/δ(t − 1) < δ(t + 1)/δ(t).
(iii) Steeper discounting the higher the informational rents: as F(θ)/f(θ) increases,
both δ(t) and δ(t)/δ(t − 1) decrease.
The ﬁrst property, a higher value being attached to close events relative to distant
ones, is the most basic ﬁnding of studies on discounting.11 As already discussed, this is the
result of larger informational rents (that take the form of increased consumption) being
granted in earlier periods in exchange for labor. The second and third properties relate to
modern behavioral theories of time-evaluation. Indeed, a period-to-period discount rate
that falls monotonically is the deﬁning property of hyperbolic discounting. Although still
controversial, this characteristic of time preferences has received substantial support from
experimental and empirical research ﬁrst in psychology and now in economics (Frederick,
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2002). According to Proposition 3, our brain conﬂicts may
be at the source of this behavioral anomaly. As for the third property, it has also been
argued that individuals may not necessarily have a unique discount function (Frederick,
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2002). Preliminary evidence in Loewenstein et al. (2001)
suggests that people exhibit diﬀerent rates of time-preference for diﬀerent categories of
activities (e.g., repetitive tasks versus viscerally driven behaviors). One can argue that
idiosyncratic preference shocks are less predictable, and therefore informational rents
are more important, in settings subject to impulsive reactions (indulging a vice) than
11There are, however, examples of negative time preferences as illustrated, for example, in Loewenstein
and Prelec (1991).
18in recurrent tasks (ﬂossing one’s teeth). Under this assumption, our model predicts a
steeper discounting in the former than in the latter category of activities.
2.5 Implementation
The previous analysis raises the question of how to map our abstract mechanism into
a neural theory. To answer this, we ﬁrst need to determine which neural circuitries are
implicated in the evaluation of alternatives (willingness to consume, displeasure of labor,
value of income). There is solid evidence that the ventral striatum (nucleus accumbens,
ventral caudate and ventral putamen) is part of the circuitry involved in the processing
of primary rewards such as food or drugs (Berns et al., 2001). Recent fMRI studies
show that it is also involved in the evaluation of aversive events such as noxious thermal
shocks (Lino Becerra et al., 2001) and cutaneous electrical stimulations (James Jensen et
al., 2003). Perhaps more surprisingly, the striatum is also implicated in incentive-driven
rewards like monetary gains and losses (Brian Knutson et al. (2000), Mauricio Delgado et
al. (2000)). Taken together, this body of research suggests that similar neural networks
are responsible for encoding diﬀerent types of values: goods with hedonic properties,
negative stimuli and even pure conditioned rewards. As summarized by Rebecca Elliott
et al. (2003, p.303): “it is clear that the neuronal substrates of ﬁnancial reinforcement
overlap extensively with regions responding to primary reinforcers, such as food.” In
terms of our model, the same agent is likely to be in charge of evaluating enjoyable and
displeasureable activities.
Once this is established, we can ask ourselves how the disciplining rule described in
the previous sections can be implemented in practice. Unfortunately, to the best of our
knowledge no work has been designed to address this question. We can combine evi-
dence from diﬀerent studies to suggest a possible mechanism. However, the argument
is necessarily speculative. First, the brain structures in the cortical systems (our prin-
cipal), who are ultimately responsible for choices and have a mental representation of
the future consequences of current actions, ‘commit’ to a subset of choice pairs. This
can be achieved, for example, by limiting the amount of signals coming from lower sys-
tems that are processed.12 Second, the systems that encode value (our agent) receive
anticipatory information about the value of each good or activity. The key, as discussed
12An information censoring of this type is discussed in Bechara’s (2005) neurocognitive theory of
willpower: “Another mechanism of impulse control is the ability to resist the intrusion of information
that is unwanted” (p.1460).
19above, is that overlapping systems are activated for rewards of vastly diﬀerent nature.
Moreover, according to Read Montague and Berns (2002), the information about these
disparate rewards (money, food, sex, work) is accumulated and converted into a common
scale or ‘neural currency’, which is then used to compare alternatives. This aggregation
process occurs in the orbitofrontal-striatal circuit. Third, once the relative importance of
rewards is evaluated, the striatal system ‘communicates’ its preferred pair to the motor
cortex (Knutson et al., 2000). This may be done by sending some neuronal signals carry-
ing information about the desirability of x and some other signals carrying information
about the desirability of y. If all signals were processed, the striatal would overstate the
positive (negative) value of any pleasant (unpleasant) activity. Because the amount of
information processed is restricted (see the ﬁrst point), it is in the agent’s best interest
to carefully select the relative number of signals in favor of each alternative.
3 Some implication for choice over time
3.1 Choice bracketing and expense tracking
Studies in marketing and psychology show that consumers often set budgets for narrowly
deﬁned categories (clothing, entertainment, food) and track expenses against budgets
(Thaler (1985), Itamar Simonson (1990)). The cost of narrow choice bracketing is obvious:
it forces consumers to perform local rather than global maximizations. The beneﬁt is
less clear. Read, Loewenstein and Rabin (1999) suggest that narrow bracketing requires
less involving calculations and can be used as an eﬀective self-disciplining mechanism
to avoid excesses. However, we are not aware of any model that formalizes this or
any other potential advantage. The argument seems intuitive, but not fully satisfactory.
First, nothing prevents a broad bracketing consumer from mimicking a narrow bracketing
one. Second and more importantly, the experiments of Chip Heath and Jack Soll (1996)
demonstrate that a narrow deﬁnition of categories leads people to underconsume some
goods and overconsume some others.
We propose a diﬀerent rationale for this behavior.13 Following the general model
described in section 2.1, consider an individual who intertemporally allocates a ﬁxed
initial income k between two classes of goods, clothing (xt > 0) and entertainment
(yt > 0). The principal can select her desired composition of expenditures but ignores
13For the sake of brevity, we only describe a sketch of the model. Detailed proofs of the arguments for
the diﬀerent cases are available upon request.
20the relative willingness θt of agent-t to consume each good. Formally, the instantaneous
utility is:
Ut(xt,yt;θt) = θtu(xt) + yt.
The intertemporal budget constraint, B(·), is:
T X
t=1
(xt + pyt)(1 + r)
T−t 6 k(1 + r)
T−1,
where 1 and p are the unitary prices of goods x and y. If decisions are delegated,
agent-1 chooses the optimal allocation across goods in period 1, but he exhausts the
budget. Following Lemma 2, the principal can also limit the per-period budget of the
tempting good to its expected optimal level (as in the precommitment rules developed by
Thaler and Shefrin (1981)). However, as demonstrated in Proposition 1, the principal can
do better by imposing a per-period negative relationship between expenditures in each
category. The strategy does not lead to ﬁrst-best optimality. Nevertheless, it requires
a simple rule of behavior and enables the person to achieve some self-discipline, the
advantages of narrow bracketing described in the literature.14 Furthermore, if valuations
for the goods are independent, this self-imposed negative correlation of expenditures will
generate, on average, overconsumption of one good and underconsumption of the other.
Thus, it reconciles the self-control motive for mental accounting emphasized by Thaler
(1985) with the simultaneous feeling of wealth and poverty described in Heath and Soll
(1996).
A similar argument can rationalize the tendency of self-employed individuals (ﬁsh-
ermen, salesmen, writers) to work longer hours on less productive days. Consider the
case of New York City cabdrivers. Assume that the principal does not have access to
the information regarding the diﬃculty to earn money, and that the agent dislikes work-
ing. Delegation results in shirking. The principal can achieve some self-discipline and a
second-best allocation of time by arbitrarily dividing the day into several subperiods (e.g.,
morning and afternoon). Formally, denote by lm
t and la
t labor in the morning and labor
in the afternoon, and assume that one unit of labor translates into one unit of earnings.




t) where ψm(·) and ψa(·)
represent the disutilities of labor, and θt captures a shock in the relative diﬃculty to earn
14If the optimal (concave) relationship between expenditures in the two commodities is cognitively too
diﬃcult to implement, the individual may resort to a simpler (linear) relationship at a small extra utility
loss (we thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue).














where C represents the daily consumption of the agent. In this case, the principal pro-
poses an incentive mechanism where labor in the afternoon is inversely related to earnings
in the morning: the agent is allowed to work less in the afternoon if earnings in the morn-
ing are higher. An intrapersonal contract of this type can partly explain the puzzling
negative elasticity of wages and hours of work documented by Camerer et al. (1997).
3.2 Life-Cycle theory
The life-cycle model provides a framework to study intertemporal consumption. This
theory makes several predictions. First, holding intertemporal levels constant, the dy-
namics of income accumulation should not aﬀect the dynamics of consumption. Second,
the propensity to consume current income should be independent of its source. Third, if
discretionary savings are positive, then an increase in pension savings should not aﬀect
total savings. Empirical analyses (e.g., Robert Hall and Frederick Mishkin (1982)) sug-
gest that people behave quite diﬀerently: the propensity to consume strongly depends on
current income, on the source of wealth and on the level of mandatory savings (see She-
frin and Thaler (1988) and Thaler (1990) for reviews of the empirical anomalies). Several
theories have been proposed to explain these diﬀerences. They include bequest motives,
capital market imperfections, changing preferences, self-control problems, and mental ac-
counting rules. Our approach may help explain some of the links between income and
consumption in a uniﬁed framework.
First, our model predicts that, controlling for total wealth, consumption tracks earned
income. The intuition is simple. Assume that either the pleasure of consumption or the
disutility of labor varies from period to period and is only known to the agent. The prin-
cipal achieves self-discipline with the rule work more to consume more. Consumption
is above its ﬁrst-best level, but excesses are mitigated. By contrast, if the individual is
retired or unemployed, this compensatory mechanism cannot be used. To avoid maxi-
mum consumption, the principal must impose no ﬂuctuations, that is, the consumption
chosen by an average type under full information (see Lemma 2). Note that our theory
predicts not only lower average levels but also smaller ﬂuctuations in consumption during
retirement or unemployment. We are not aware of any existing test of this hypothesis.
22Second, the source of wealth aﬀects the propensity to consume. Consumption is
granted in exchange of costly eﬀort. Therefore, as income is obtained from a less costly
source (capital gain, windfall, income borrowed against future labor), the principal loses
the ability of using this tool to elicit valuations. The evidence provides mixed support for
this prediction. On the one hand, income which is more costly to obtain is spent in larger
proportions: the propensity to consume regular income is greater than the propensity
to consume a bonus which is itself greater than the propensity to consume a capital
gain (Shefrin and Thaler, 1988). This ﬁnding is consistent with our theory. On the
other hand, consumption is excessively correlated with most income changes, including
windfalls. Our theory cannot explain this ﬁner result.
A third and more subtle prediction relates to the eﬀect of mandatory savings on total
savings. Note that dn∗
1(θ1)/dc∗
1(θ1) > 0 and d2n∗
1(θ1)/dc∗
1(θ1)2 < 0. This means that a
higher valuation agent consumes a bigger fraction of his earned income. Therefore, a
mandatory savings rate (e.g., a pension plan) constrains only the consumption choices
of agents whose valuation is above a certain cutoﬀ ˜ θ. Interestingly, a mandatory savings
rate relaxes the incentive problem for high valuation agents and, given the positive rate
of return, it is optimal to increase their labor in exchange of this reduced consumption.
In turn, it is also optimal to shift upwards the labor of agents with valuations below ˜ θ,
which results in increasing their savings also. This imperfect substitutability between
mandatory and discretionary savings captures another behavioral anomaly documented
in the literature.
4 Incentive and informational conﬂicts in the brain
4.1 The general setting
Temptation puts the individual in a state of mind where activities that provide a moderate
objective satisfaction suddenly become irresistible. Salient motivations or impulsive urges
may be pathological (eating disorder, bipolar disorder, or obsessive-compulsive disorder).
They are most prevalent for addictive substances (Robinson and Berridge (2003) and
Bernheim and Rangel (2004)). However, the recent evidence from neuroscience suggests
that diﬀerent systems mediate the feeling of pleasure (liking) and the motivation to
seek pleasure (wanting). Furthermore, discrepancies may manifest also for regular goods
(Berridge, 2003). In this section, we incorporate our third conﬂict, namely the dichotomy
between liking versus wanting, in our dual-system model of the brain. To better focus on
23incentive salience and informational asymmetry, we abstract from the temporal conﬂict.
More precisely, the individual engages in two activities, x and y, during one period. The
true instantaneous payoﬀ of the individual is:
U(x,y;θ) = θu(x) + v(y)
where θ represents the valuation of the more tempting good x relative to the less tempting
(or non-tempting) good y. We assume that θ ∈ Θ = [θ,θ] and that its c.d.f. F(θ) satisﬁes
the same hazard rate conditions as in section 2. Function U(·) is the utility representation
of the “liking” system (the principal), which captures how consumption of the diﬀerent
goods does aﬀect welfare. However, what motivates the individual to consume is:
W(x,y;θ) = θw(x) + v(y)
Function W(·) is the utility representation of the “wanting” system (the agent), which
captures how perceived welfare and choices are biased by visceral inﬂuences. We assume
that u(0) = 0, u0(x) > 0, u00(x) < 0 and w(0) = 0, w0(x) > 0, w00(x) < 0: both principal
and agent ﬁnd good x enjoyable, although they might disagree on its contribution to
welfare. In this one-period problem, the scarcity or budget constraint, B(·), takes the
following expression:
x − r(y) 6 0
The utility of the principal and the budget constraint of the consumption and labor model
studied in section 2.2 correspond to v(y) = −y and r(y) = y, with the variables c and
n being replaced by x and y respectively. The choice bracketing application with two
pleasurable goods brieﬂy presented in section 3.1 corresponds to v(y) = y and r(y) =
k−py. We will assume that either v0(y) > 0 and r0(y) < 0 for all y (activity y is pleasant
but tightens the budget constraint) or v0(y) < 0 and r0(y) > 0 for all y (activity y is
unpleasant but softens the budget constraint). Let us call U and W the optimization
programs of the principal and the agent when θ is common knowledge:
U : max
x,y θu(x) + v(y) and W : max
x,y θw(x) + v(y)
s.t. x 6 r(y) s.t. x 6 r(y)
To ensure concavity of these optimization programs, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 The utility of the principal and the agent satisfy:15
15Note that, if r(y) is linear, a suﬃcient condition for assumption 1 to hold is v00(y) 6 0.
24θu00(z) + v00(r−1(z))[r−10(z)]2 + v0(r−1(z))r−100(z) 6 0 ∀z, θ
θw00(z) + v00(r−1(z))[r−10(z)]2 + v0(r−1(z))r−100(z) 6 0 ∀z, θ
Denote by (xF(θ),yF(θ)) and (xD(θ),yD(θ)) the optimal choices of principal (ﬁrst-

























In both cases, the budget constraint binds since valuable resources should not be wasted.
Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order conditions, we get dxF/dθ > 0 and dxD/dθ > 0: a higher
valuation translates into a greater consumption under ﬁrst-best and delegation. Incentive
salience states that the agent wants to consume an amount of the tempting good x which
is considered excessive by the principal, that is, xD(θ) > xF(θ) for all θ. The following
assumption ensures that this inequality holds.16
Assumption 2 u0(x) < w0(x) ∀x.
Given u(0) = 0 and w(0) = 0, assumption 2 also implies that u(x) < w(x) for all x.
Last, we denote by T(·) the function that transforms the utility of the agent for good x
into the utility of the principal:
u(x) = T(w(x))
where T(z) > 0 and T 0(z) > 0 for all z. Given assumption 2, T 0(z) < 1 for all z.
4.2 Incentive salience and optimal delegation of choices
As in section 2, the principal maximizes welfare. Unlike before, the conﬂict is due to
the agent being subject to urges that aﬀect perceived utility (W(·) 6= U(·)). Under
complete information, biased motivations are irrelevant since the principal can impose
her optimal pair of choices (xF(θ),yF(θ)). Under incomplete information, full delegation
results in excessive consumption of the tempting good. To combat this tendency, the
principal must design a revelation mechanism. Interestingly, the options oﬀered under
16u0(x) < w0(x) ⇒ 0 = θu0(xF) + v0(r−1(xF))r−1
0
(xF) < θw0(xF) + v0(r−1(xF))r−1
0
(xF) ⇒ xF <
xD.
25incentive salience are quite diﬀerent than under temporal conﬂict. The principal solves









s.t. θw(x(θ)) + v(y(θ)) > θw(x(˜ θ)) + v(y(˜ θ)) ∀ θ, ˜ θ ( ˆ IC)
x(θ) 6 r(y(θ)) ( ˆ BB)
The solution (ˆ x(θ), ˆ y(θ)) to program UAI characterizes the constrained optimum that
the cognitive system can achieve given the private information and biased motivation of
the aﬀective system.
Proposition 4 (Asymmetric information with incentive salience)
When T 00(z) 6 0, the principal sets a consumption cap ¯ x and requires ( ˆ BB). Given
this rule, there exists a valuation ˆ θ such that the agent chooses his optimal pair (xD(θ),yD(θ))
if θ < ˆ θ and the optimal pair (xD(ˆ θ),yD(ˆ θ)) of an agent with valuation ˆ θ if θ > ˆ θ.17
When T 00(z) > 0, there exist n (> 2) subintervals such that:
ˆ x(θ) = xD(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ,θ1] ∪ [θ2,θ3] ∪ ... ∪ [θn−2,θn−1];
ˆ x(θ) = xD(θ1)∀θ∈(θ1,θ2), ˆ x(θ) = xD(θ3)∀θ∈(θ3,θ4),..., ˆ x(θ) = xD(θn−1)∀θ∈(θn−1,θ].
If n > 2, then resources are wasted (i.e., x(θ) < r(y(θ))) for all valuations θ > θ2.
Contrary to Proposition 1 where intervention was sophisticated and intrusive, the
principal now follows a simple rule-of-thumb. Condition T 00 6 0 together with assumption
2 implies that u00(x) < w00(x): the marginal disagreement between the principal and the
agent increases with the level of consumption, and therefore with the valuation of the
tempting good. The cost of letting the agent get away with his desired consumption
of x is small as long as his valuation is low. When the valuation exceeds a certain
threshold ˆ θ, overconsumption becomes a serious problem and a drastic intervention in
the form of a consumption cap becomes optimal. One informal way of interpreting this
mechanism against temptation is the principal saying “as long as you don’t abuse, you
can do whatever you want.” Given this rule, the agent makes sure the budget constraint
is always binding (ˆ x(θ) = r(ˆ y(θ))), so resources are never wasted.18
For the reader familiar with incentive theory, this form of contract should be intrigu-
ing. For the sake of exposition, suppose that y is unpleasant (v0(y) < 0) and r(y) is
17See the appendix for the formal determination of ¯ x. There is also a limit case discussed in the proof
where ¯ x 6 xD(θ) and therefore ˆ x(θ) is constant for all θ ∈ [θ,θ].
18Instead of a consumption cap on x, the principal can equivalently set a consumption ﬂoor on y.
26linear (so the constraint is x 6 y). The intuition behind the technical aspect of this
result is a consequence of the three tools that the principal can use to satisfy incentive
compatibility. First and trivially, the principal can let the agent choose the pair he wants.
Second, she can force all types of agents to make the same pooling choice. Third, she
can optimally select the (monotone) relation between x and y that induces self-selection.
In standard problems, incentive compatibility is ensured via the third criterion or a com-
bination of the second and third criteria. By contrast, in our setting, there is a tension
between inducing self-selection and managing resources. On the one hand, self-selection
requires the indiﬀerence curves that relate x and y to be increasing and convex. On the
other hand, a binding budget constraint requires a linear relation between x and y. This
immediately implies that if the principal wants to induce self-selection, she must waste
resources. The idea is illustrated in Figure 1a: to preserve convexity of the relation be-
tween x and y, the agent consumes xF(θ) and all types except ˜ θ engage in excessive y (the
slanted area represents the amount of wasted resources, x(θ) < y(θ)). The other alterna-
tive for the principal is to leave full freedom to the agent, in which case ˆ x(θ) = xD(θ) and
ˆ y(θ) = xD(θ). By deﬁnition and as illustrated in Figure 1b (full line), this also results
in overconsumption of the tempting good relative to the ﬁrst-best option (dotted line)
but, at least, resources are not wasted. Because overconsumption is especially severe
for high-valuation types, the principal ﬁnds it optimal to delegate choices and limit the
ineﬃciency of overconsumption by constraining all agents above a certain valuation ˆ θ
(dashed line).
[ Figures 1a and 1b here ]
This simple rule has other implications. Keeping the consumption and labor inter-
pretation, it follows that the individual will incur excesses in both the pleasant and the
unpleasant activities: the principal indulges extra consumption (xD(θ) > xF(θ)) but
requires extra work (yD(θ) > yF(θ)). While self-control problems can explain overcon-
sumption and strict rule setting can explain overwork, it is usually diﬃcult to ﬁnd reasons
that explain both types of excesses at the same time. One can also think of the conﬂict
in terms of morality. The principal has a constrained willingness to engage in pleasur-
able activities that are socially harmful or unaccepted. The agent does not share this
high-order moral disposition. Rather than imposing self-discipline for all valuations, our
result shows that the principal ﬁnds it optimal to simply limit the maximum amount
27of the pleasurable activity that the agent is allowed to enjoy.19 Finally, we can apply
this mechanism to a diﬀerent setting. Consider for instance a parent (our principal) who
can constrain the options available to her oﬀspring (our agent). The oﬀspring privately
knows the value he derives from the tempting activity, and the parent internalizes only
partly his preferences. In such a situation, full delegation of choices up to a point and
ﬁrm intervention thereafter is the parent’s second-best optimal strategy.
What happens when T 00 > 0? The conﬂict between the principal and the agent can
be either increasing or decreasing in consumption. When the conﬂict is increasing, we
obtain the same insights as before: n = 2, so there is delegation for all θ ∈ [θ,θ1] and
pooling (or identical consumption) for all θ ∈ (θ1,θ]. When the conﬂict is decreasing or
non-monotonic, the regions of delegation and pooling as a function of θ alternate. The
optimal consumption path of the tempting good is illustrated in Figure 2.
[ Figure 2 here ]
By allowing identical consumption of x to all types in an interval (say, (θi−1,θi)), the
principal moderates excesses. However, delegation in the next interval [θi,θi+1] becomes
problematic: an agent below but close to θi will want to pick the contract of a type-θi.
To avoid mimicking, the principal must ensure that utility is continuous in valuation.
This is achieved by imposing a lump sum change in the other good y to all agents with
type θi and above. Since the extra change in y exceeds the strict needs to satisfy the
budget balance, the constraint ( ˆ BB) becomes slack. Overall, the decision to intervene
is governed by the following tradeoﬀ: a longer pooling interval limits overconsumption
of the tempting good but requires a bigger jump in consumption at the boundary, and
therefore a larger waste of resources to ensure incentive-compatibility. Finally, note that
all contractual regimes in UAI are characterized by either delegation or pooling, but never
by self-selection as in typical mechanism design problems.
We wish to emphasize that the principal implements diﬀerent incentive mechanisms
under temporal and temptation conﬂicts because the tradeoﬀs are diﬀerent. Under tem-
poral conﬂict, excessive consumption of x has a high cost as it implies that fewer resources
are left for the future. By contrast, meeting the budget constraint is not essential since
the accumulated resources can be used in the following period(s). Under incentive con-
ﬂict, the allocation of resources between periods is not an issue, but meeting the budget
19See B´ enabou and Tirole (2004) for an explanation of compulsive behavior based on hyperbolic
discounting, and Rabin (1995) for a diﬀerent view on the eﬀect of moral preferences and moral constraints
on behavior.
28constraint is important because unused resources are forever lost.
Finally, program UAI is technically very similar to Amador, Werning and Angeletos
(2006), where activities are consumption at dates 1 and 2 and the disagreement results
from hyperbolic discounting, rather than incentive salience. Their setting coincides with
our model under linear conﬂict (T 00 = 0). Both papers prove the optimality of a consump-
tion cap rule (or, in their case, a savings threshold rule) under monotone hazard rate and
linear conﬂict.20 Their paper relaxes the monotone hazard rate assumption whereas our
paper relaxes conﬂict linearity. Under either generalization (but for diﬀerent reasons),
wasting resources may become part of the principal’s optimal strategy.
4.3 An example: linear conﬂict
Consider the special case of a linear conﬂict between the wanting and liking systems.
Formally, let w(x) = αu(x) with α > 1, so T 00(z) = 0. Applying Proposition 4 to this
particular conﬂict, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5 Under a linear incentive conﬂict, choices are (xD(θ),yD(θ)) for all θ 6 θl
and (xD(θl),yD(θl)) for all θ > θl, where θl is such that αθl = E[θ | θ > θl].
For a given valuation, the agent is less likely to make free decisions when the conﬂict
is high and when the willingness to consume is drawn from a less favorable distribution.
Fix the utility of the principal u(x). As the impulsive urges become more pronounced
(α larger), the gap between the optimal choice of the principal and the motivations of
the agent increases, so the former needs to control the latter more tightly. This results
in a higher probability of intervention (∂θl/∂α < 0), as illustrated in Figure 3.
[ Figure 3 here ]
This also means that more intransigent rules reﬂect a stronger conﬂict. Note that θl(α) <
θ for all α > 1 and limα→1 θl(α) = θ: the principal intervenes as soon as there is a
diﬀerence between true and perceived utility, even if it is minimal. Also, θl = θ for all
α > E[θ]/θ: if the bias is suﬃciently important the principal imposes the same action
for all valuations. Finally, one may argue that the wanting system learns the preferences
of the liking system over time or that visceral impulses are better controlled with age
and experience (see e.g. the construction of preferences argument discussed previously).
20See below for an analytical characterization of this special case and some comparative statics.
29Either way, if α moves closer to 1 over time, the incentive scheme shifts towards a more
lenient intervention.
The distribution of valuations also aﬀects intervention. Suppose that θ can be drawn
from F(θ) or G(θ), where G(θ) stochastically dominates F(θ), that is, F(θ) > G(θ) for all
θ ∈ (θ,θ). We know that the optimal scheme balances the costs of overconsumption with
the costs of pooling. For a given threshold θl, consumption is more likely to be restrictive
if the distribution is more favorable. In order to avoid an excessive intervention, the
principal then becomes more lenient when valuations are more likely to be high.
5 Concluding remarks
The theory of organizations has a long tradition in modelling the ﬁrm as a nexus of
agents with incentive problems, informational asymmetries, restricted communication,
etc. Based on recent neuroscience research, this paper argues that individual decision-
making should be studied from that same multi-system perspective and proposes a step in
that direction (Brocas and Carrillo (forthcoming) discuss in more detail some advantages
of this “neuroeconomic theory” methodology). Other studies have implicitly followed a
similar approach. A main diﬀerence is that the literature has always focused on automatic
processes versus rational optimization whereas we exploit diﬀerent neuromechanisms: the
cognitive inaccessibility to our motivations and the presence of salient motivations.
Some readers may resist the idea of brain modularity. Yet, conﬂicts between brain
systems have been amply demonstrated and are now mainstream in some areas of neuro-
science research, such as memory (Poldrack and Rodriguez, 2004) or information process-
ing (Miller and Cohen, 2001). Recent studies even suggest that some systems act as
conﬂict mediators (William Gehring et al. (1993), John Kerns et al. (2004)). Biologists,
neuroscientists and psychologists have proposed diﬀerent evolutionary theories to explain
a brain architecture composed of multiple, interacting systems. For example, Richard
Dawkins (1976) argues that selection operates at the gene not at the individual level.
John Tooby and Leda Cosmides (1992) claim that, in a changing environment, internal
conﬂicts are often a remnant of past evolution. More recently, Adi Livnat and Nicholas
Pippenger (2006) show that under some reasonable physiological limitations, the develop-
ment of modules with conﬂicting objectives may result in improved outcomes. This last
argument should not be too surprising. We know that in competitive environments and
given some organizational constraints (bounded resources, restricted channels of commu-
30nications), decentralized ﬁrms may outperform centralized ones. Since the brain is also
subject to all sorts of physiological constraints, it seems reasonable to think that a similar
argument could be applied here.
Our model may be extended in several dimensions. We can introduce correlated
valuations (or learning over time, as in the construction of preferences approach) and
attenuate the conﬂict by assuming that agents have a positive concern for future returns.
This creates a self-signaling problem diﬀerent from that in Bodner and Prelec (2003) and
B´ enabou and Tirole (2004): agents require extra rents to reveal their information since
that knowledge is subsequently used by the principal to their own detriment (the ratchet
eﬀect). We can also allow agents to invest resources that increase their productivity of
labor. It may also be interesting to test empirically or experimentally some behavioral
implications of our theory. Results of special relevance in our model are: (i) the use of
narrow choice bracketing as a self-disciplining device to overcome myopic behavior; (ii)
the lower ﬂuctuation in consumption when the individual does not have access to labor;
and (iii) the diﬀerences in discount rates for categories of activities that are subject to
diﬀerent degrees of idiosyncratic preference shocks.
As a ﬁnal note, we would like to stress the importance of collaborative ventures
between neuroscientists and economists. On the one end, experiments in neuroscience
provide invaluable information to economic theorists about how to build better organi-
zational models of the brain. On the other end, theoretical models of decision-making
processes can help experimental neuroscientists determine which hypotheses about the
architecture of the brain deserve testing priority. Although it is far too early for an assess-
ment, this methodology may eventually result in a new approach to economic decision-
making, moving from a single-unit formulation with a centralized decision-maker to a
multi-unit formulation with strategic interactions.
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τ(θτ) are anticipated future levels. Agent-t only cares about choices
at t. His utility when his valuation is θt and he chooses the pair (ct(˜ θt),nt(˜ θt)) is:
Ut(θt, ˜ θt) = θtu(ct(˜ θt)) − nt(˜ θt)
Incentive Compatibility. The mechanism oﬀered by the principal is incentive compati-
ble if and only if Ut(θt,θt) > Ut(θt, ˜ θt) ∀θt, ˜ θt. Let Ut(θt) ≡ Ut(θt,θt). The two necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for incentive compatibility at date t are:21











> 0 ⇒ ˙ ct(θt) > 0 (IC2)t
Feasibility. Labor nt(θt) must lie in [0, ¯ n] and consumption must be positive, that is:
Ut(θt) > θt u(ct(θt)) − ¯ n ≡ B
l(θt) (FL1)t
Ut(θt) 6 θt u(ct(θt)) ≡ B
u(θt) (FL2)t
ct(θt) > 0 (FC)t
Budget. At date t, the individual inherits (positive or negative) saving st−1, consumes
ct, works nt and leaves (positive or negative) saving st for the next period. Since resources
can a priori be thrown away, the following budget constraint inequality must hold:
st−1(1 + r) + nt(θt) > ct(θt) + st (B)t
with s0 = 0 (no initial resources) and sT > 0 (no deﬁcit at the end of the last period).
Program. The objective function of the principal at date t can thus be reduced to the
maximization of St subject to (IC1)t, (IC2)t, (FL1)t, (FL2)t, (FC)t, (B)t.
Period T. There is no conﬂict between principal and agent-T, so (IC1)T and (IC2)T
trivially hold. Savings at T are wasted, so sT = 0. Ignoring feasibility, maximization of




T(θT)−sT−1(1+r). We will assume
that ¯ n is such that n∗
T(θT) ∈ [0, ¯ n] for all θT.
21Techniques are standard (see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, ch.7)) so the proof is omitted.
32No waste of resources. Given, (c∗
T(θT),n∗














Since ST−1 is increasing in sT−1, then (B)T−1 is binding. Suppose now that (B)t+1 to
(B)T−1 are binding. Then, n∗

















− st(1 + r)
T−t
































Since St is increasing in st, then (B)t is binding. Thus, we have proved that (B)T−1 is
binding and that (B)t is binding if (B)t+1 to (B)T−1 are binding. The combination of
both results implies that (B)t is binding for all t. In words, it is optimal not to waste
resources.
Incentive compatibility and labor constraint. Given that nt(θt) = θt u(ct(θt))−Ut(θt) and















which is decreasing in Ut(θt). Note also that, provided (IC2)t is satisﬁed, then:
˙ B
l(θt) = ˙ B
u(θt) = u(ct(θt)) + θt u
0(ct(θt))˙ ct(θt)) > ˙ Ut(θt) = u(ct(θt)) > 0
In words, the slope of the equilibrium utility is positive but smaller than the slopes of the
labor feasibility constraints Bl(θt) and Bu(θt). Since we just proved that the objective
function is decreasing in Ut(θt) (rents must be minimized), it means that (IC1)t binds at
the top, that is, Ut(θt) binds on Bl(θt) at θt = θ (this, in turn, implies that nt(θ) = ¯ n). Let
us assume that (IC1)t does not bind at any other point. Given the previous inequalities,
this is true if Ut(θ) < Bu(θ) or, equivalently, if nt(θ) > 0. We will neglect this inequality






33Optimal consumption. Combining the previous ﬁndings and using the standard integra-



















θu(ct(θ)) − ¯ n

1 − (1 + r)T−t

+ (1 + r)T−t+1st−1 + Vt+1
So the optimal consumption maximizes St under (IC2)t and (FC)t. Denote by ˆ ct(θt) the











= (1 + r)
T−t
Diﬀerentiating this expression it comes that ˆ ct(θt) is increasing in θt. Thus, in the absence
of the term ct(θ) in St, ˆ ct(θt) would be the optimal consumption. Note however that by
setting a consumption ˆ ct(θ) for an agent with valuation θ, the principal is giving rents
θu(ˆ ct(θ)) to all the agents below that valuation. In order to decrease these rents, the
principal might prefer to constrain consumption above a certain cutoﬀ.22 Overall, the





ˆ ct(θt) ∀θ < θ∗
t(at)
at ∀θ > θ∗
t(at)
where ˆ ct(θ∗
t(at)) = at. The only remaining issue is to determine the value at. Three cases






















θu(at) − ¯ n

1 − (1 + r)
T−t

+ (1 + r)
T−t+1st−1 + Vt+1
This function is decreasing in at, so the principal always chooses at 6 at. For all at ∈










22This is a technical diﬀerence of our analysis relative to standard programs. Typically, the utility at
the endpoint (where the individual rationality (IR) constraint binds) is exogenous. In our setting (with
no IR constraint) the utility at the endpoint Ut(θ) is mechanism dependent, that is, it is aﬀected by c(θ).
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θu(at) − ¯ n

1 − (1 + r)
T−t

+ (1 + r)
T−t+1st−1 + Vt+1


































Note that Kt(at) is decreasing in at and that Kt(at) < 0 therefore at is never optimal
(there is always bunching at the top). We have two cases.
If Kt(at) < 0, then S0
t(at) < 0 for all at ∈ [at,at]. The optimal consumption level at is
in [0,at]. Therefore c∗





θu(at) − ¯ n

1 − (1 + r)
T−t

+ (1 + r)
T−t+1st−1 + Vt+1
If Kt(at) > 0, there exists ˆ at ∈ (at,at) such that Kt(ˆ at) = 0. The welfare is strictly
decreasing when at > ˆ at and it is concave when at ∈ (at,ˆ at). If S0
t(at) < 0, we are in the
same case as before (bunching for all θt). Last, if S0
t(at) > 0, then there exists an interior
maximum a∗




Optimal labor. Given that n∗
t(θt) = θt u(c∗
t(θt)) − Ut(θt), we have:
n
∗













In particular, for all θt > θ∗
t(a∗
t), there is bunching and n∗











which is strictly positive for all θt < θ∗
t. Last, the neglected inequality n∗
t(θ) > 0 is
automatically satisﬁed if ¯ n is “suﬃciently large” or, more speciﬁcally, if:










35Appendix B. Proof of Propositions 4 and 5. Let W(θ) = θw(x(θ)) + v(y(θ)).
Using standard techniques (proof omitted), the incentive compatibility constraints ( ˆ IC)
in program UAI are equivalent to the following ﬁrst- and second-order conditions:
˙ W(θ) = w(x(θ)) and ˙ x(θ) > 0
Also, when v0 > 0 and r0 < 0 or when v0 < 0 and r0 > 0, ( ˆ BB) can be rewritten as:
W(θ) 6 θw(x(θ)) + v(r
−1(x(θ)))






θu(x(θ)) − θw(x(θ)) + W(θ)
i
dF(θ)
s.t. ˙ W(θ) = w(x(θ)) ( ˆ IC1)
˙ x(θ) > 0 ( ˆ IC2)
W(θ) 6 B(θ) = θw(x(θ)) + v(r−1(x(θ))) ( ˆ BB)
The equilibrium utility increases at rate ˙ W(θ) = w(x(θ)) and the upper bound of ( ˆ BB)




+w(x(θ)). Given ( ˆ IC2),
assumption 1 and the deﬁnition of xD(θ) as the maximum in W, then in equilibrium:
˙ W(θ) S ˙ B(θ) ⇔ x(θ) S x
D(θ).
Since xF(θ) < xD(θ), then (x(θ0),y(θ0)) with x(θ0) > xD(θ0), yields lower utility to the
principal than (xD(θ0),r−1(xD(θ0))), provided the latter is incentive compatible at θ0. The
indiﬀerence curves of the principal satisfy x0(y) = −v0(y)/θu0(x). They are decreasing
and convex if v0 > 0 and r0 < 0 and increasing and convex if v0 < 0 and r0 > 0. To
satisfy incentive compatibility, dx/dy = −v0(y)/θw0(x). Assume now that the contract
entails (xD(θ0),yic(θ0)) for some θ0 with xD(θ0) < r(yic(θ0)). Consider a deviation to
x(θ0) > xD(θ0) and let y(θ0) be such that (x(θ0),y(θ0)) is incentive compatible. Given the
previous properties, θu(xD(θ0))+v(yic(θ0)) > θu(x(θ0))+v(y(θ0)). This proves that it is
never optimal to set x(θ) > xD(θ) for any θ. Therefore, from now on, we shall restrict
the attention to solutions of the form x(θ) 6 xD(θ) for all θ.
Note that W(θ) enters positively in the principal’s objective function. Also, x(θ) 6
xD(θ) implies ˙ W(θ) 6 ˙ B(θ). Combining both arguments, W(θ) binds in ( ˆ BB) at the




w(x(s))ds + W(θ) with W(θ) = θw(x(θ)) + v(r
−1(x(θ)))











s.t. ˙ x(θ) > 0 ( ˆ IC2)
W(θ) = θw(x(θ)) + v(r−1(x(θ))) (E)
x(θ) 6 xD(θ) (D)
where (E) is the utility at θ and (D) is the restriction on the domain. The rest of the
proof proceeds as follows. First, we ignore ( ˆ IC2) and (E) and ﬁnd the solutions that
satisfy (D). Second, we construct the solutions that also satisfy ( ˆ IC2). Last, we introduce
(E). Let:

































∂x +[w0(x)]2 θT 00(w(x)). Denote
by ˜ x(θ) the interior optimum of Λ(x,θ), if it exists. We shall consider two diﬀerent cases.
Case 1: T 00(·) > 0.
∂Λ(˜ x(θ),θ)
∂x = 0 implies
∂2Λ(˜ x(θ),θ)
∂x2 > 0, so ˜ x(θ) is the unique minimum
of Λ(x,θ). The maxima are the corner solutions 0 or xD(θ). Also, there exists ˜ θ such
that for all θ > ˜ θ, Λ(x,θ) is strictly decreasing in x and the maximum is 0. For θ 6 ˜ θ,
the maximum alternates between 0 and xD(θ).
Case 1a. Suppose that the maximum at θ is xD(θ). Then, there exists a series of cutoﬀs
(θ0,...,θ2t−1,θ2t) where θ0 = θ, θ2t−1 = ˜ θ and θ2t = θ, such that:
˜ x(θ) =

xD(θ) if θ ∈ [θs,θs+1]
0 if θ ∈ (θs+1,θs+2) ∀ s ∈ {0,2,...,2t − 2}
Note that ˜ x(θ) does not satisfy ( ˆ IC2) in the neighborhood of θs+1. When adding this
constraint, we could set consumption at xD(θs+1) for all θ ∈ (θs+1,θs+2) (it is obviously
suboptimal to go above). It may however, be preferable to start pooling at θ0
s+1 < θs+1:
the cost of xD(θ0
s+1) < xD(θ) ∀θ ∈ (θ0
s+1,θs+1] may be oﬀset by the beneﬁts of xD(θ0
s+1) <
xD(θs+1) ∀θ ∈ (θs+1,θs+2).23 Overall, there will exist new cutoﬀs θ0
s+1 ∈ [θs,θs+1] such




xD(θ) if θ ∈ [θs,θ0
s+1]
xD(θ0
s+1) if θ ∈ (θ0
s+1,θs+2) ∀ s ∈ {0,2,...,2t − 2}
23The argument is the same as to where bunching should start in standard mechanism design problems
when ˙ x(θ) > 0 is not automatically satisﬁed.
37Last, let a be the optimal consumption at θ, where a 6 xD(θ) to satisfy (D). Denote
by ˆ x(θ) the optimal solution of the principal’s program under ( ˆ IC2), (E), (D). We have




∗(θ),θ)dF(θ) + θw(a) + v(r
−1(a))
This utility is increasing in a, so a = xD(θ). Overall, the optimal solution is:
ˆ x(θ) = x
∗(θ) =

xD(θ) if θ ∈ [θs,θ0
s+1]
xD(θ0
s+1) if θ ∈ (θ0
s+1,θs+2) ∀ s ∈ {0,2,...,2t − 2}














since ˙ W D(θ) = w(xD(θ)). The agent’s utility under the optimal contract (ˆ x(θ), ˆ y(θ)) is:




w(ˆ x(c))dc + θw(ˆ x(θ)) + v(r
−1(ˆ x(θ))) (4)
For all θ ∈ [θ,θ0
1], we have ˆ x(θ) = xD(θ) and W(θ) = W D(θ), so v(ˆ y(θ)) = v(r−1(xD(θ))),
and resources are not wasted. For all θ ∈ (θ0
1,θ2), we have ˆ x(θ) = xD(θ0
1). Using (2)
and (4), we have W(θ) = W D(θ0
1) + (θ − θ0
1)w(xD(θ0
1)). Using (1) and (3), we get
v(ˆ y(θ)) = v(r−1(xD(θ0
1))) and, again, resources are not wasted. For all θ ∈ [θ2,θ0
3], we
have ˆ x(θ) = xD(θ) but W(θ) < W D(θ). Then, v(ˆ y(θ)) < v(r−1(xD(θ))), that is, for all
θ > θ2 resources are wasted.
Case 1b. Suppose that the maximum at θ is 0. Following the analogous reasoning as in






0 if θ ∈ [θ,θ1)
xD(θ) if θ ∈ [θs,θ0
s+1] ∀ s ∈ {1,3,...,2t − 1}
xD(θ0
s+1) if θ ∈ (θ0
s+1,θs+2) ∀ s ∈ {1,3,...,2t − 1}
Adding constraint (E) to the program, modiﬁes the solution into ˆ x(θ) = a for all θ ∈ [θ,θ1)







∗(θ),θ)dF(θ) + θw(a) + v(r
−1(a))









ˆ a if θ ∈ [θ,θ1)
xD(θ) if θ ∈ [θs,θ0
s+1] ∀ s ∈ {1,3,...,2t − 1}
xD(θ0
s+1) if θ ∈ (θ0
s+1,θs+2) ∀ s ∈ {1,3,...,2t − 1}
Using the same method as in case 1a, we can compute ˆ y(θ). For all θ < θ1, ˆ x(θ) = ˆ a 6
xD(θ) and W(θ) =
R θ
θ w(ˆ a)ds + θw(ˆ a) + v(r−1(ˆ a)). Combining it with (3), we get that
v(ˆ y(θ)) = v(r−1(ˆ a)), so resources are not wasted. For all θ ∈ [θ1,θ0
2], consumption is xD(θ)
and, using (2) and (4), we have W(θ) < W D(θ). Therefore, v(ˆ y(θ)) < v(r−1(xD(θ))) and
resources are wasted for all θ > θ1.
Case 2: T 00(·) 6 0. If ˜ x(θ) exists, it is the unique interior maximum. However, it is
decreasing in θ so it does not satisfy ( ˆ IC2). Again, there exists ˜ θ such that for all θ > ˜ θ,
Λ(x,θ) is strictly decreasing in x, so the maximum is 0. For all θ 6 ˜ θ, ˜ x(θ) exists. The
maximum of Λ(x,θ) under (D), is ˜ x(θ) if ˜ x(θ) 6 xD(θ) and xD(θ) if ˜ x(θ) > xD(θ).
Case 2a. Since
dxD(θ)
dθ > 0 and
d˜ x(θ)
dθ < 0, if xD(θ) 6 ˜ x(θ), then there exists θ0 such that
xD(θ) < ˜ x(θ) for all θ < θ0 and xD(θ) > ˜ x(θ) for all θ > θ0. To satisfy ( ˆ IC2), the principal
could set xD(θ) for all θ < θ0 and xD(θ0) for all θ > θ0. However, using the same logic as




xD(θ) if θ ∈ [θ, ˆ θ)
xD(ˆ θ) if θ ∈ [ˆ θ,θ]
Adding constraint (E) to the program modiﬁes the solution into ˆ x(θ) = a and ˆ x(θ) =




∗(θ),θ)dF(θ) + θw(a) + v(r
−1(a))
which is increasing in a, so a = xD(θ). Overall, the optimal solution is:
ˆ x(θ) =

xD(θ) if θ ∈ [θ, ˆ θ)
xD(ˆ θ) if θ ∈ [ˆ θ,θ]
Using the same reasoning as in case 1a, resources are never wasted. Last and for the sake













39The ﬁrst-order condition that determines the optimal cutoﬀ ˆ θ is then given by (note that























dF(θ) < 0, we then have that ˆ θ < θ0.
Case 2b. Since
d˜ x(θ)
dθ < 0, if xD(θ) > ˜ x(θ), then it is optimal to set the same consumption
level for all θ. This amount is given by:




Λ(a,θ)dF(θ) + θw(a) + v(r
−1(a))
Note that ∂Λ





= 0, so ˆ a < xD(θ).
Case 3: Special case T 00(·) = 0. Assume w(x) = αu(x) with α > 1. We have:






Following the same reasoning as in case 2a, we have ˆ x(θ) = xD(θ) if θ ∈ [θ,θl) and

















− 1)θf(θ) + 1 − F(θ)

dθ=0(5)
⇒ E[θ | θ > θl] = αθl (6)





















where the ﬁrst term is equal to zero by (5) and K(θl) > 0 by (5) and dK/dθ < 0. Also,




















Last, if F(θ) > G(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ,θ), then EG(θ)[θ | θ > ˜ θ] > EF(θ)[θ | θ > ˜ θ] for all ˜ θ.
As a result and given (6), θG
l > θF
l where θG
l is the cutoﬀ under distribution G(θ) and θF
l
is the cutoﬀ under distribution F(θ).
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area of wasted resources
xF(θ) < y(θ)








Figure 1b. Full delegation with and without cap
(xD(θ),yD(θ))
ˆ θ
(xD(θ),yD(θ)) up to ˆ θ









Figure 2. Consumption of tempting good when T00 > 0
pooling
delegation



























Figure 3. Consumption of tempting good with α00 > α0 > α > 1
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